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1. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
2. Id. at 465.
3. Id. at 467.
4. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1694 (2008); Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 275 (1992).
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For the past 80 years privacy has been of increasingly important legal
concern. In 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Public Utilities
Commission of the District of Columbia et al. v. Pollak et al.1 that plaintiffs
had no legal right to avoid radio broadcasts in Washington, D.C. city trolleys
and buses. The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished a bus, a public space, from
a home, a private space, and ruled that the broadcasts were not inconsistent
with public convenience, comfort, or safety because individuals in public are
“subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others.”2 The
lone dissenter, Justice William Douglas, urged, “Liberty . . . must mean
more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone
is indeed the beginning of all freedom.”3
Over ensuing decades, the Supreme Court has continued to wrangle
with privacy and its boundaries in many contexts. Women have a
fundamental right to reproductive freedom, including contraceptive use,
freedom from involuntary sterilization, and abortion—but they do not have
the right to be entirely free of governmental interference, and can be subject
to fees, waiting periods, and informational counseling requirements.4
Parents have a fundamental right to determine many, even most aspects of
the care, control, and upbringing of their children, but cannot make decisions
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5. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1991).
6. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
7. David Yamane, The Sociology of U.S. Gun Culture, 11 SOC. COMPASS, no. 7, 2017, at 7.
8. Louis Menand, Why Do We Care So Much About Privacy?, NEW YORKER (June
18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-much-aboutprivacy (quoting J. Douglas, dissenting).
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that imperil the child to the point of serious bodily harm, such as choosing
not to obtain medical care for a serious physical illness.5 The privacy
doctrine has never ceased to be controversial, perhaps partially because of
its dependence on context and partially because it is constructed out of
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those [other constitutional]
guarantees.”6
In addition to its legal meaning, privacy has complex and everchanging
sociocultural contours, influenced by diverse factors ranging from individual
hobbies and personalities to judicial opinions and enacted laws. For
instance, “the widespread practice of legally carrying a gun in public was
facilitated by the movement for shall issue concealed carry laws.”7 In
essence, our own orientations to privacy are incredibly subjective and in flux
and may be even be contradictory across contexts. We may go to great
lengths to prevent others from knowing that we pass gas after eating broccoli
or look up strange topics on internet searches, but care not a whit about
reading HIPAA disclosures at the doctor’s office or share genetic data
obtained through direct-to-consumer genetic testing services.
Privacy claims thus have legal and social meaning. According to Sarah
Igo, privacy is “elastic,” and can function as “a kind of default right when an
injury has been inflicted and no other right seems to suit the case.”8 In the
past decade, there have been increasingly frequent attempts by individuals
who espouse “gun rights” stances to fit the exercise of Second Amendment
privileges into the envelope of the privacy doctrine, with varying outcomes.
Plaintiffs have contended that privacy gives them the right to silence
intrusive questioning from medical professionals, to have handgun permit
holders’ identifying information protected from public disclosure under
freedom of information laws, and to confer anonymity to litigants.
This essay examines how Second Amendment enthusiasts attempt to
strategically articulate a Second Amendment privacy interest in being free
from interference from both governmental actors and private actors with
ownership of, access to, or use of firearms, and with what consequences.
Part I explores privacy’s status as a legal and sociocultural construct, the
violations of which carry significant cultural, social, and emotional
consequences. It then explores the stigma that firearms enthusiasts often

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 32 Side A

02/26/2019 14:13:21

MEDEIRA_MACROED READY FOR PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

Spring 2019]

2/15/2019 5:16 PM

A SECRET WEAPON?

557

claim to experience, and discusses how they attempt to manage stigma,
including claiming privacy rights. Part II examines three cases in which gun
rights supporters and organizations have claimed privacy rights, addressing
doctor-patient counseling about firearms and firearm safety, disclosure of
handgun permit holders’ identifying information, and disclosure of litigants’
identities. This essay concludes that, while most courts have thus far
declined to extend privacy protections to firearm ownership and use, they
may do so in ways that confirm the stigmatized nature of the Second
Amendment.

I. Privacy, the Second Amendment, and
Second-Class Citizenship
A. Understanding Privacy as a Legal and Sociocultural Construct

02/26/2019 14:13:21

9. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 927 (1992).
10. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980), Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
11. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of
the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2009).
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Legally, privacy doctrine is a veritable hydra, with heads representing
reproductive autonomy, family law, Fourth Amendment, and First
Amendment bases. The doctrine stems from Samuel Warren’s and Louis
Brandeis’s seminal article from 1890, The Right to Privacy, which proposed
extending laws protecting privacy in other situations to encompass the right
to control publicity of one’s own information. One branch of privacy law,
following Griswold v. Connecticut, protects “decisional” privacy—the right
to make certain profoundly personal decisions free from government
intrusion, which has encompassed contraception, marriage, family
relationships, procreation, child rearing, and education.9 A second branch of
case law has focused on “informational privacy,” the right to control public
dissemination of private facts, in contexts such as media publication and
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law.10 These two categories overlap;
a woman has the right to be free from undue governmental inference when
deciding to obtain an abortion, and deserves privacy in keeping this decision
confidential.11 Although the decision to own, carry, and use a firearm is
protected, Second Amendment privacy arguments primarily implicate
informational privacy concerns.
In a sociological sense, privacy is “the access of one actor (individual,
group, or organization) to another,” “what people conceal and reveal and
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12. Denise Anthony, Celeste Campos-Castillo & Christine Horne, Toward a Sociology of
Privacy, 2017 ANN. REV. SOC., no. 43, at 251.
13. Id. at 251.
14. Id. at 252.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 259.
17. Id. at 260.
18. Id. at 251.
19. Id. at 251.
20. Id. at 258.
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what others acquire and ignore.”12 Privacy is influenced by laws that “define
the contents, levels, and types of access that are legal and illegal,” social
practices, technologies that “affect[] ease of access and structure[] who has
access to whom,” and privacy norms, which “identify the characteristics of
access that are deemed appropriate within a context.”13
Individuals’ attempts to manage privacy by controlling access to
themselves and their information reflect “effort[s] to achieve [the appropriate
balance of giving and seeking information] by complying with privacy
norms and ensuring that others do not violate those norms as well as
implementing their own privacy preferences.”14 Moreover, privacy is
intertwined with social order. Because visibility facilitates social control and
affects behaviors, social order demands an “optimal balance between
revealing and concealing.”15 Above all, “organizations, corporations, and
governments, rather than individuals, have the greatest ability to access
others and potentially invade privacy,”16 particularly because technology
makes it easy and cheap to “gather, stockpile, and analyze information.”17
Privacy norms are violated by “levels of access that are too high or too
low, access to the wrong kind of information, access through inappropriate
channels, and inappropriate uses of information.”18 Though privacy norms
vary greatly across persons, periods, cultures, and contexts, their violation
produces certain predictable negative psychological and emotional reactions,
with consequences for individuals and relationships; people who perceive
their privacy has been invaded “may feel invaded or isolated, or they may
feel that another actor is being too secretive or exposing too much.”19
Privacy violations influence trust in others and “essential social institutions,”
and news of breaches can reduce confidence and perceptions of institutional
legitimacy and security, prompting greater concealment attempts.20
Privacy’s maintenance, then, is intertwined with human emotions, which
determine how we “construct these subjective private spaces,” erecting and
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maintaining “barriers” of “various cultural, psychological, and material
factors.”21
Monitoring—and responses to being monitored—change in reaction to
social relationships and technologies (Foucalt’s panopticon22 is a prime
example). The institutions that engage in monitoring activities are varied.
Governments monitor citizens to “collect information to ensure compliance
with relevant rules,”23 through observation, informants, and technology.
Employers monitor employees to “protect company assets, control public
communications and ensure that employees are as productive as possible.”24
Monitoring is more acceptable when it is “perceived as contributing to the
collective good,” “contributes to collective safety and security,” or concerns
out-group members and not one’s self, such as cameras set up in a city to
catch criminal activity.25 However, such vigilance can inspire negative
reactions when it implies a lack of trust, and when the people under
surveillance feel they have something to hide.26 Disclosure of information
can build trust and enhance relationships, but invites risk by enhancing
intimacy and allowing opportunities for confidentiality. As a result,
concealment is especially critical for individuals who feel they are
stigmatized, who “may seek to hide their discrediting condition to maintain
their standing in a relationship.”27 “Patterns of disclosure [and concealment]
“strengthen ties among group members and create stronger boundaries
between the group and outsiders.”28
B. The Stigmatized Second Amendment

02/26/2019 14:13:21

21. Luke Stark, The Emotional Context of Information Privacy, 32 INFO. SOC’Y, no. 1, 2016,
at 14, 17.
22. See generally MICHEL FOUCALT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(1979).
23. Anthony, et al., supra note 12, at 253.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 254.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 256 (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 257.
29. Yamane, supra note 7, at 1 (quoting James D. Wright, Ten Essential Observations on
Guns in America, 32 SOC’Y, no. 3, 1995, at 63–64).
30. Id.
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The ownership and use of firearms have been at the heart of American
history since the Revolution; “gun ownership is normative, not deviant,
behavior across vast swaths of the social landscape.”29 Nonetheless, “there
is no sociology of guns, per se”; firearms as a research topic has largely been
ceded to disciplines that analyze criminology, violence, and public health.30
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31. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
32. Yamane, supra note 7, at 4; A.D. Olmsted, Morally Controversial Leisure: The Social
World of Gun Collectors. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION, Fall 1988, at 277, 278 (citation omitted).
33. Olmsted, supra note 32, at 278.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 281 (citation omitted).
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Jimmy D. Taylor, Gun Shows, Gun Collectors, and the Story of the Gun: An
Ethnographic Approach to U.S. Gun Culture 148 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University) (on file with author).
38. Yamane, supra note 7, at 4.
39. Taylor, supra note 37, at 153.
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But American gun culture, now centered upon “armed citizenship,” has
changed profoundly since Obama’s presidency and the watershed U.S.
Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller,31 which held that the
Second Amendment right to possess a firearm is individual in scope,
unconnected to militia service. These cultural and legal changes, together
with accompanying increases in firearm sales, the visibility of gun rights
legislation, and advocacy, have wrought profound changes to the Second
Amendment landscape in the past decade.
Despite their increased visibility and legal protections, firearms and gun
rights advocates still face stigma. Certain firearm types, accessories, and use
typify “morally controversial leisure,” and guns themselves may be “morally
controversial products.”32 In morally controversial leisure, participants often
cannot “explain their activities in ‘rational’ language acceptable to nonparticipants.”33 Collecting firearms may be linked to obsession and
compulsion34 and unprogressive ideals, as “guns symbolize security,
freedom, and wholesome recreation to a bedrock America that is at its core
lower-middle or working class, small town or rural, less exposed to higher
education, . . . conservative or tradition oriented.”35 Criminological or
public health research on firearms issues connect them to crime, violence,
and disease: “the more guns, the greater the spread of gun related
pathology.”36 Sociologically speaking, then, gun enthusiasts have “a master
status associated with undesirable auxiliary traits.”37
Gun owners may feel that others hold them “partially responsible for
the very existence of gun violence,”38 and thus employ out-group stigma
management techniques with non-enthusiasts to “avoid being perceived as
morally or socially flawed by virtue of one’s identification with a particular
stigmatized status or activity.”39 The most obvious way to manage stigma is
to dissemble, or “pass,” among non-enthusiasts, exercising “strategic control
over what information is revealed to, or withheld from, non-peers” through
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selective concealment from coworkers and neighbors.40 Individuals who do
not attempt to conceal their firearm-related interests can provide an
alternative frame “within which potentially stigmatizing information is
either neutralized or presented in a positive light.”41 For example,
individuals can give “dignifying accounts,” justifications for firearm
ownership and use including hunting ethics, the “calmness, discipline, and
self-control required and cultivated by shooting.”42
Gun owners may also utilize “impression management” strategies, such
as denying that their guns inflict harm on others; invoking commitments to
idealized values like the right to bear arms or military sacrifices that preserve
constitutional freedoms; panning non-enthusiasts’ moral failures,
inconsistencies, and lack of knowledge; rationalizing their enthusiasm for
firearms to distance themselves from “bad guys” or “bad guns;”43 and
“identify[ing] themselves as deeply committed” and “knowledgeable.”44
They may be “extremely serious” about performing safety regiments,
engaging in what Olmsted terms “dramaturgical discipline.”45 Significantly,
unlike other stigmatized groups like the homeless and mentally ill, gun
enthusiasts can “trade on his/her stigmatized identity at will,” playing up
certain stereotypes that have positive in-group meanings (like “badassitudes”
or stoicism).46
C. Privacy as a Sword Against Stigma

Taylor, supra note 37, at 153, 155.
Id. at 154.
Yamane, supra note 7, at 4.
Id.
Olmsted, supra note 32, at 283.
Id. at 284.
Taylor, supra note 37, at 173.
KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHT SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 2 (1992).

02/26/2019 14:13:21

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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Social movements—many of which are organized directly to combat
stigma—often make certain legal claims to gain legitimacy, social esteem,
and social capital. A movement gains social credence if it can convincingly
claim to advance “civil rights” and eradicate discriminatory practices
through protective legislation or case law. People in search of civil rights
are victims of oppression, often trapped in a complex web of oppressive
social, economic, and cultural institutions and practices. Those who fight
for civil rights are heroes, “champions of social justice.”47 In civil rights
litigation, law becomes a “tool by which they can force perpetrators of
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unlawful conduct to comply with socially established norms.”48 Second
Amendment advocates have recently begun to articulate civil rights
arguments; America has a “gun problem,” with individuals who own and use
firearms facing discrimination and loss of rights. This claim appropriates the
collective action frame of groups such as African Americans and women,
turning the moral tables on liberals who are seen as traditional civil rights
supporters—and gun rights opponents. “Civil Rights” is a “master frame”49
that can “serve as [a] dominant ‘algorithm[]’ that resonate[s] deeply across
social movements and protest cycles.”50 Thus, “by appropriating the civil
rights master frame, the gun rights . . . movement[] seek[s] to culturally
legitimate their claims (especially among liberal audiences) and to counter
opponent organizations such as . . . gun control groups.”51
Law, too, is a master frame; claims of “legal rights” are a “dominant
symbolic framework of rules, rights, and obligations [which] set[]
boundaries on how collective actors conceive of their grievances and
goals.”52 Thus, “disputes over the proper construction of legal symbols is
likely to take place both within a given movement itself and between the
movement and its external environment”—including the conferral of
“rights” in the first place.53 According to Pedriana:

02/26/2019 14:13:21

48. BUMILLER, supra note 47 at 2.
49. Shoon Lio, Scott Melzer & Ellen Reese, Constructing Threat and Appropriating “Civil
Rights”: Rhetorical Strategies of Gun Rights and English Only Leaders, 31 SYMBOLIC
INTERACTION, no. 1, 2008, at 11.
50. Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and
Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC., 1718, 1718, 1725 (2006).
51. Lio, Melzer & Reese, supra note 49, at 11.
52. Pedriana, supra note 50, at 1728.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1729.
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[L]aw is a unique type of symbolic resource; it is not only a means
by which a movement can, by appealing to deeply resonant legal
symbols, garner legitimacy and support for the movement. Law
in part also represent the ends of that process. . . . Access to courts
allows aggrieved groups to turn a symbolic frame into a legal
claim. And courts have the power to codify . . . those claims. If
successful, such legal change not only further enhance a
movement’s symbolic framing efforts; legal change also
transforms social and political relationships and thus have the
capacity to exert power and influence beyond the movement
itself.54
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55. Ind. Code § 34-28-8-6(1) & (2).
56. Katarzyna Celinska, Individualism and Collectivism in America: The Case of Gun
Ownership and Attitudes Toward Gun Control, 50 SOCIO. PERSP., no. 2, 2007, at 229, 231–234
(citation omitted).
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Recently, Second Amendment advocates have attempted to use law as
a master frame to articulate individual privacy interests in firearm ownership
and use. The individual right to privacy is “another broad legal right steadily
expanded by the federal courts throughout the 1960s,” one traditionally
associated with issues very different from the Second Amendment, being a
“legal frame more strategically equipped to symbolically represent the
burgeoning national debate over abortion, and the women’s movement’s
interest in expanding reproductive rights.”
Redeployed to address gun rights causes, Second Amendment privacyseeking strategies have been particularly successful on the state level. For
example, in 2011 the Indiana General Assembly enacted the “Disclosure of
Firearm or Ammunition Information as a Condition of Employment Law,”
prohibiting any Indiana employer from requiring job applicants or
employees to “disclose information about whether the applicant or employee
owns, possesses, uses, or transports a firearm or ammunition” unless that
disclosure concerns the individual’s ability to fulfill employment duties;
employers also cannot condition employment or any opportunities or
benefits upon foregoing these activities.55 Notably, there is no public safety
exception, such as if an employee is an imminent danger to self or others and
may have a firearm stored in his car. Plaintiffs can sue for actual and punitive
damages, injunctive relief, costs and attorneys’ fees.
A Second Amendment privacy doctrine also maps well onto other gun
rights virtues, such as individualism, conveying the message that the
government needs to clear a protected space for activities associated with
these rights. Individualistic people are “defined as emotionally independent
or ‘detached from community,’ and they tend to be self-contained,
autonomous, and self-reliant,” and “do not rely on law enforcement for
providing protection.”56 Pushing for privacy means that gun owners could
behave as they wanted and have a right to be left alone while doing it. That
is a clearly productive way to both beat back the stigmatization that is
allegedly associated with gun rights, and to secure additional social and legal
space for firearms ownership and activities.
However, this turns
individualism on its head, as the “good guys with guns” are now victims that
need to be protected, although as a population firearms owners famously
resist victimization on principle.
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II. Privacy in Firearms and Second Amendment Litigation
Privacy claims have been raised and effectuated in several legal
contexts, including legislation and case law. Such claims have been directly
addressed in three cases: Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida57; Doe v.
Putnam County; Mager v. State,58 and NRA v. Bondi.59 Each touches upon a
different aspect of privacy: the right to be free of uncomfortable speech
touching upon protected Second Amendment rights, the right to prevent the
public from accessing intimate information connected with the exercise of
protected Second Amendment rights (such as names and addresses of gun
permit holders), and the right to participate anonymously in a legal Second
Amendment challenge to avoid stigma and harassment.
A. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida: Do Gun Owners Have a Right to
Be Free From Firearms Speech?

02/26/2019 14:13:21

57. 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017).
58. Putnam, No. 16-CV-8191 (KMK), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169727 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2018); Mager, 595 N.W.2d 142 (Mich. 1999).
59. Bondi, No. 4:18-cv-00137-MW-CAS, 2018 WL 1234695 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2018).
60. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1303.
61. Id. at 1300.
62. Id. at 1314.
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In Wollschlaeger, the Eleventh Circuit considered the constitutionality
of Florida’s Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA), overturning it on the First
Amendment grounds that it impermissibly restricted medical professionals’
speech. As enacted, FOPA prevented medical professionals from asking all
patients whether they owned firearms or had them in their home and from
recording patients’ answers, with exceptions only for situations where
particular information suggested such inquiries were medically necessary for
a particular patient, such as suicidal tendencies. FOPA violations were
punishable by fines of up to $10,000, letters of reprimand, probation or
suspension, compulsory remedial education, or license revocation.60
Shortly after FOPA was passed, several doctors and medical
organizations filed a federal lawsuit against Florida officials, alleging some
of its provisions were unconstitutional.61 In defending FOPA, state officials
argued the legislation was enacted to protect patient privacy by “keeping
private facts away from the public eye.”62 The NRA, in its motion to
intervene, urged that FOPA protected “NRA members from intrusive,
irrelevant questioning . . . and discrimination on account of their exercise of
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63. Proposed Intervenor National Rifle Association’s Motion to Intervene and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 5, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 11-22026-Civ-Cooke/Turnoff (S.D. Fla.
June 27, 2011).
64. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Accompanying Memorandum of Law
at 1, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, No. 11-22026-Civ-Cooke/Turnoff (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2011).
65. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 814 F.3d 1159, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015).
66. Id. at 1214–15.
67. Id. at 1216–18.
68. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1314 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
69. Id. at 1315.
70. Id. at 1315–16.
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Second Amendment rights.”63
Plaintiff medical professionals and
associations, however, asserted that FOPA impermissibly chilled or
prohibited conversations on matters such as routine firearm safety
counseling that were important to injury prevention and depriving patients
of their First Amendment right to hear censored information.64 This lawsuit
gave rise to two rulings.
Initially, in its 2015 ruling, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that patients had
such a privacy interest, ruling that such “unnecessary” firearms questions
were, in effect, bad medicine: “good medical care does not require inquiry
or record-keeping regarding firearms when unnecessary to a patient’s
care.”65 The court found that such privacy protections were needed due to
power imbalances between doctors and patients, which could make patients
feel helpless and coerced into answering such queries.66 According to the
majority, FOPA’s legitimacy was grounded in physician adherence to codes
of conduct mandating privacy and confidentiality, and negligence or
malpractice.67
These arguments received little deference in the Eleventh Circuit’s
2017 en banc decision, however. There, the Eleventh Circuit stated, under
an unchallenged FOPA provision, “any patients who have privacy concerns
about information concerning their firearm ownership can simply refuse to
answer questions on the topic.” Florida had already significantly restricted
disclosure of patient medical records, “and there is no evidence that . . .
doctors and medical professionals have been improperly disclosing patients’
information about firearm ownership.”68 Nor was there evidence that
“patients who are bothered or offended by such questions are
psychologically unable to choose another medical provider.”69 Finally,
patients have no right to avoid wholesale any questioning or speech that they
found uncomfortable or controversial.70 The Eleventh Circuit observed, “the
Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the
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unwilling listener or viewer,”71 and “doctors and patients undoubtedly
engage in some conversations that are difficult and uncomfortable . . . many
are those who must endure speech they do not like, but that is a necessary
cost of freedom.”72
The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc ruling was a major blow to supporters
of a Second Amendment privacy doctrine; law, as the master frame, had
rejected privacy claims outright. While it did not definitively exclude
Second Amendment rights from privacy protection, it declined to extend
them so far as to dictate how medical professionals counseled patients.
Rather, it put the burden on patients to refuse to engage in such
conversations, which could materially benefit other patients and prevent
injuries. This reveals the court’s assumption that individuals have the ability
to assert control over their own information, regardless of the power
imbalances inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. Curtailing firearms
counseling is a necessary public good, not a stigmatizing subject, and
refusing to answer is a stigma maintenance strategy. Ultimately, the en banc
ruling places firearms ownership and use in the space of other controversial
issues for which individuals must negotiate norms and in everyday
interpersonal interactions and activities; just because Second Amendment
concerns can be stigmatizing is not enough to grant them privacy protection.
B. Doe v. Putnam and Mager v. State: Do Permit Holders Have a Right to
Shield Identifying Information from Public Scrutiny?

02/26/2019 14:13:21

71. Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1315–16 (quoting Erznoznik c. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 210 (1975)).
72. Id.
73. Jason Horowitz, N.Y. Newspaper Posts Gun Permit Map, Starts Nasty Online Battle,
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ny-newspaper-posts-gunpermit-map-starts-nasty-online-battle/2012/12/26/747ae7d6-4fb0-11e2-950a-7863a013264b_story.html.
74. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 2, Doe v. Putnam Cty., No.
7:16-cv-8191 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2016).
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On December 24, 2012, the Journal News, a New York newspaper,
published an interactive map that identified the name and address of each
person who held a state handgun permit in Westchester and Rockland
counties.73 Thereafter, in Doe v. Putnam, anonymous plaintiffs and the New
York State Rifle and Pistol Association challenged a New York law allowing
public disclosure of gun permit holders’ identifying information on the
grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
privacy and “impermissibly chill[ed] the free and uninhibited exercise of
fundamental Second Amendment rights by subjecting permit holders to
unwanted public attention and censure by those in the community who are
opposed to guns and gun owners.”74 Plaintiffs contended that “the fact that
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[O]wnership of a gun does not reveal intimate or embarrassing
details of an individual’s private life. . . . gun ownership is a
highly regulated area of conduct in this state. . . . Defendants do
not point to, and we are unaware, of any customs, mores, or

02/26/2019 14:13:21

75. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 74, at 6.
76. Doe No. 1 v. Putnam Cty., No. 16-cv-8191, 2018 WL 4757967, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2018).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Mager v. State, 595 N.W.2d 142 (Mich. 1999).
81. Id. at 143.
82. Id. at 146.
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a person is a handgun permit holder and is therefore exercising his or her
individual Second Amendment right to armed self-defense in the home is a
private, personal matter that is protected from public disclosure by the
government under the constitutional right to privacy.”75 Evaluating these
claims, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated
that the plaintiff had to prove that there was no set of circumstances under
which the disclosure statute would be valid under the Second Amendment
under intermediate scrutiny.76 The court agreed with the New York Attorney
General’s argument that there is no legal authority for the position that such
information is a private, personal matter protected from public disclosure by
the government under the Constitutional right to privacy.77 Not all
disclosures of private information will trigger constitutional protection;
under Second Circuit precedent, such information was “in a limited set of
factual circumstances involving one’s health and personal information,” like
HIV-positive status and sexual assault.78 Thus, the court stated, disclosure
of name, address, and permit holder status is not one of these very limited
circumstances that implicated the right to privacy.79
In an earlier Michigan case, Mager v. Dep’t of State Police,80 the
Michigan Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. In Mager, the
plaintiff had asked for the names and addresses of registered Michigan
handgun owners, but the State Police refused, stating that such information
was private information that could be withheld from disclosure under state
Freedom of Information Act exceptions.81 Under Michigan law, exemptions
to disclosure applied to information of a “personal nature”—that revealed
intimate or embarrassing details of a person’s private life, as evaluated by
community customs and mores.82 The trial court held that such information
was not private information:
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ordinary views of the community that would lead to the
conclusion that gun ownership is an intimate or embarrassing
detail of an individual’s private life.”83
On appeal, however, the court overturned this decision, stating that gun
ownership was information of a personal nature:
The ownership and use of firearms is a controversial subject. . . .
Further, knowledge that a household contains firearms may make
the house a target of thieves, and thus endanger its occupants. . . .
A citizen’s decision to purchase and maintain firearms is a
personal decision of considerable importance. We have no doubt
that gun ownership is an intimate or, for some persons, potentially
embarrassing detail of one’s personal life.84

Mager v. State, No. 197222, 1997 WL 33330940, at *2 (Ct. App. Mich. Dec. 12, 1997).
Mager, 595 N.W.2d at 146–47.
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83.
84.
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Reconciling Doe and Mager requires accepting that there are competing
perspectives on whether information about gun ownership (and, by
implication, use) is intimate, personal, and embarrassing. Doe implicitly
differentiated sociocultural stigma from that requiring legal protection and
rejected the assertion that gun ownership status resembled intimate details
such as personal medical information. Mager came to the opposite
conclusion, citing that such details were controversial and could be
embarrassing, even dangerous, in the wrong hands. Mager demonstrates that
law as a master frame is capable of recognizing a Second Amendment
privacy claim, while Doe illustrates that this reasoning is contentious and can
be rejected by subsequent courts, limiting its rhetorical and pragmatic
authority. It is especially damaging to Second Amendment privacy rights
claims that the Second Circuit’s dismissal occurred in a context where
disclosure could expose handgun permit holders to theft or other crime—the
very rationale why most own a handgun. This also suggests that permit
holders’ safety was less determinative of case outcomes than each judge’s
differing valuations of firearms stigma. The Doe holding leaves gun rights
supporters in a truly uncomfortable position: attain personal safety (and
lawful handgun possession) by obtaining a handgun permit at the cost of
disclosure or attain privacy (and forego lawful handgun possession) by not
obtaining a permit at the cost of personal safety.
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C. NRA v. Bondi: Does a Legal Party Have a Right to Anonymity to
Escape Stigma and Harassment?

02/26/2019 14:13:21

85. Order Denying Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonyms at 4–5, NRA v. Bondi, No. 4:18cv-00137-MW-CAS, 2018 WL 1234695 (N.D. Fla. May 13, 2018).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 8 (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Privacy was also implicated in an ancillary open courts question in NRA
v. Bondi, in which two 19-year-old plaintiffs sought anonymity in contesting
a Florida law raising the statutory age for gun ownership from 18 to 21
following the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School massacre, stating that
pseudonyms were necessary because of the suit’s highly controversial
nature.85 Jane and John Does argued that they were afraid that public
knowledge of their involvement in the suit would make them “subject to
harassment, intimidation, threats, and potentially even physical violence.”86
The court record contained an affidavit from Marion Hammer, the former
NRA president, stating that, after media had publicly identified her with the
lawsuit, she had received harassing emails and phone calls threatening her
life and physical well-being.87
The district court, while expressing sympathy for the plaintiffs’ claims,
nonetheless found that parties to suits are granted pseudonyms only in
“exceptional” circumstances to overcome a constitutional presumption of
openness in court proceedings, such as being “required to disclose
information of the utmost intimacy.”88 The majority first noted that
anonymity had been denied in prior cases involving birth control, abortion,
homosexuality, welfare rights for illegitimate children, sexual assault,
substance use, attempted suicide, HIV infection fears, and for publicity-wary
relatives of 9-11.89 It then clarified that anonymity was granted only in
exceptional cases, and rarely for stigma or harassment: “the threat of hostile
public reaction to a lawsuit, standing alone, will only with great rarity
warrant public anonymity.”90 Finally, the district court emphasized that no
court had ever deemed the Second Amendment or the rights it confers
quintessentially private.91
The motion decision in NRA v. Bondi is the most troubling of these three
cases because it directly imperils law’s legitimacy as a master frame. Here,
the court confesses that its hands are tied by legal precedent, and so it must
rule that Second Amendment stigma’s potential consequences do not merit
privacy protection. Common sense conflicts with formalistic rulings.
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Present here, also, is an important countervailing interest: openness and
transparency in judicial proceedings. Here, the consequences for gun rights
supporters are more stark: either risk exposure and harassment to fight
perceived injustice, or forego exposure and opportunities to reform the law.
Stigma maintenance strategies are also drastically reduced for these named
plaintiffs; they cannot dissemble but must openly acknowledge their
involvement in such legal challenges—although they can certainly justify
this participation. And as the court’s own statement confirms, this
justification strategy stands to be highly persuasive, even for individuals who
may disagree with their legal arguments.

Conclusion: Whither Second Amendment Privacy?
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The U.S. Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller was
intended to enshrine individual protections for firearm ownership and use,
but thus far it has done a poor job of delivering on this promise.
Consequently, the past decade has witnessed gun rights’ supporters’ attempts
to attain additional legal recognition of Second Amendment rights, including
under the privacy doctrine. Privacy doctrine affords an attractive means for
Second Amendment advocates to attain increased legal legitimacy for
firearm ownership and activities, secure the social, cultural, and physical
spaces in which such behaviors take place, and counter the perceived stigma
associated with such behaviors. To date, state legislatures have been more
receptive to these claims than courts, with most judges being reluctant to
extend traditionally narrow privacy shields to include problematic
interactions with physicians, public disclosure of gun permit holders’ names
and addresses, and publication of litigants’ actual names. While Second
Amendment activities are indisputably constitutionally protected, courts
may accord them less weight than other intimate subjects for which
(according to judicial reasoning or legal precedent) disclosure carries more
profoundly harmful consequences.
Ironically, two disparate conclusions could be drawn from these
outcomes. First, courts may conclude that Second Amendment claims lack
the requisite degree of stigma to trigger privacy protection—reasoning that
could suggest gun rights advocates have been quite successful in eradicating
the stigma they claim to have traditionally faced. Second, these rulings
might be predicated on the assumption that gun rights concerns are innately
less worthy of protection than others, confirming the Second Amendment’s
second-class status. As of now, however, we lack insight into which of these
conclusions is most accurate. Thus, the question of whether and how privacy
doctrine overlaps with the Second Amendment is just one of many issues
that have grown increasingly murky since Heller.

